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ABSTRACT. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of corporate real estate disposals on 
corporate performance ratios in Europe between the years 1998-2002. In addition, it was studied whether the 
retail and telecom corporations that conducted large real estate disposals were in significantly worse condition 
before the transactions than other corporations in the same business sector. The study indicated that those retail 
corporations that had divested corporate real estate were less profitable compared to other corporations in the 
same business sector before the transactions. Similarly, some evidence was found that the telecom corporations 
that were disposing of real estate had worse capital structure and short-term solvency before the transactions 
than other European telecom corporations. It seems, however, that the overall economical environment and 
other corporate operations have often influenced the development of the performance ratios more than the 
property disposals, at least in the most volatile business sectors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Disposals of operational corporate real estate 
have become increasingly common during the past 
decade in the western and northern Europe. Similar 
development of corporate real estate sale and 
leasebacks (SLB) began much earlier in the US, 
where corporations currently own clearly less of 
their operational real estate than corporations in 
Europe. For instance, Zeckhauser and Silverman 
(1983) indicated in a paper published in the Harvard 
Business Review, that corporate real estate 
comprised anywhere from 25% to 40% of total 
assets of the US corporations. In 2002 Nappi-
Choulet estimated that the same figure was approx. 
15% in the US and approx. 35-40%' in Europe. 
Moreover, the significant difference in the property 
assets to total assets ratio between European and US 
corporations indicate that there is little reason to 
expect the trend 
of European corporate real estate disposals not to 
continue (Laposa and Charlton 2001). 
There have been signs indicating that a sig-
nificant part of corporations that have disposed of 
operational corporate real estate have been in 
financial distress or have had particularly large real 
estate holdings as opposed to other similar 
corporations or corporation's own market 
capitalization. This has many times lead to worse 
performance ratios, because real estate does not 
usually yield as much as the core business and ties a 
lot of capital resources. Therefore, one of the 
immediate reasons for the divestments of operational 
corporate real estate has been the need to lighten 
corporate balance sheet and redirect the capital into 
core business areas. This could enhance key per-
formance ratios, such as profitability, capital 
structure and liquidity ratios, depending on how the 
obtained capital is used. 
There is a great deal of literature regard- 
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ing real estate sale and leasebacks, as well as, the 
decision of real estate leasing versus buying. 
However, only a small amount of empirical research 
has been conducted to discover the true effects of 
sale and leaseback and disposal decisions on the 
corporate performance. Previous empirical research 
in this field has concentrated on stock market 
reactions of the real estate sale and leasebacks and 
spin-offs. In addition to these, some studies have 
investigated the stock market reactions of real estate 
leasing, acquisition and divestment decisions. The 
research community has, hence, neglected empirical 
research regarding the impact of real estate sale and 
leasebacks and disposals on the corporate balance 
sheet and performance ratios. This is so despite 
researchers studying sale and leasebacks generally 
acknowledge that the improvement of balance sheet 
and performance ratios are one of the largest reasons 
for disposals and leasebacks of corporate real estate. 
1.1. Performance ratios and asset SLBs 
Leasing has generally been a way to obtain off-
balance sheet finance. Traditionally, in many 
countries, lease contracts have not been shown either 
on the asset or on the liabilities side of the balance 
sheet. This has ultimately led to a situation, where it 
has been possible for corporations to raise funds for 
fixed asset investments without taking additional 
debt through leasing arrangements. Therefore, many 
corporations have been tempted to change their real 
asset holdings into cash through sale and leasebacks 
and reduce debt, which usually enhances profitability 
ratios, such as return on total assets and return on 
invested capital. On the other hand, profitability 
ratios can also be enhanced by redirecting the 
released capital into investments in the corporate 
core business areas, considered that these 
investments yield more than the corporate real estate 
assets. However, in order to be able to create 
economic profit (EVA) and shareholder value, the 
corporation should find investment oppor- 
tunities, which yield more than the corporate 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as Stern 
and Stewart showed in 1983. Therefore, if a 
corporation cannot invest with an internal rate of 
return (IRR) that exceeds its WACC, it should not 
carry out the investment. In theory, it could be 
justifiable in these situations to distribute the excess 
capital back to the shareholders as dividends, or 
through share buy-back programs to maximise the 
shareholder value, considered that reducing of debt 
is not an option. 
In addition to capital-use efficiency, the cor-
poration should be concerned about the efficiency of 
its real estate asset management. It should be noted 
that it is acceptable to carry out real estate disposals 
only if the corporation benefits from more efficient 
space-use and the corporate real estate is more 
efficiently managed by a professional real estate 
investor. Otherwise, the advantages from the more 
efficient capital use must outnumber the losses in 
real estate management efficiency. The possibility to 
add value with leasing originates from the fact that 
some real estate market operators can manage real 
estate and related risks more efficiently than others 
(e.g., Benjamin, de la Torre and Musumeci 1998). 
Thus, it could be summarised that there are at 
least three areas where corporations might be able to 
obtain efficiency gains through real estate 
outsourcing. These are 1) corporate capital-use, 2) 
corporate space-use and 3) corporate real estate asset 
management. 
1.2. Asset SLBs and shareholder value 
maximisation 
It is already known that smaller corporations 
seldom own their facilities in their growth-phase. It 
is clear that sometimes it might be wise for 
corporations to finance growth with asset sale and 
leasebacks, if there are profitable investment 
opportunities available. However, there are also 
many examples of corporations (the latest in the IT 
and telecommunications sector), which have spent 
the capital 
Corporate Real Estate Disposal Impact on Performance Ratios 133 
 
released from their corporate real estate holdings in 
very poor investments. In these cases, corporate real 
estate could have been a good diversifier in a risky 
corporate asset portfolio. This assumption is 
supported by Brounen and Eichholtz (2003), who 
indicate that real estate ownership and systematic 
risk of a company are negatively correlated. Some 
claims have also been made that a large part of 
corporations carrying out asset sale and leasebacks 
are in financial distress. In many cases, when most 
other resources have been used for bad investments, 
real estate assets have come to rescue. Hence, 
corporate real estate can work as an innovative 
source of corporate finance and has a proven role as 
a risk diversifier. 
There is evidence that corporations performing 
asset sale and leasebacks (e.g., Slowin, Sushka and 
Polonchek (1990) and Alvayay, Rutherford and 
Smith (1995)) or corporate real estate spin-offs 
obtain abnormal gains to their stock prices (e.g., 
Hite, Owers and Rogers (1984) and Ball, Rutherford 
and Shaw (1993)). A widely held explanation for this 
is that real estate is a specialised asset that may be 
undervalued either by managers or the market, or by 
both (Ball, Rutherford and Shaw 1993). 
Undervaluation is sometimes explained by in-
efficient corporate real estate management and/or by 
the inability of the financial sector to recognise the 
true risk-return profile of the real estate. Rodriquez 
and Sirmans (1996) suggest that in corporate real 
estate sell-offs and spin-offs the value increase is 
consistent with the hypothesis that corporate values 
increase when information regarding real estate asset 
values is provided to the market. On the other hand, 
according to John (1993), spin-offs increase 
shareholder wealth by reducing agency costs and 
increasing the value of tax-shields. Also Slovin, 
Sushka and Polonchek (1990) suggest that positive 
market perception results from an overall reduction 
in the present value of expected taxes. However, 
based on the hypothesis that managers seek to 
maximise corporate value, it could also be assumed 
that corporations carry out sale and leaseback 
transactions only when it is clear that the transaction 
could enhance the shareholder wealth. Thus, it 
cannot be generalised from the previous research 
findings that corporations can increase their value 
only by disposing of operational corporate real 
estate. It can only be hypothesised that in some cases 
this can be true and that the previous research 
findings are consistent with the assumption that 
managers really try to seek ways to maximise 
shareholder value. 
Researchers have also shown that in some asset 
intensive business sectors corporations may have 
particularly large real estate holdings in comparison 
with corporation's market capitalisation. For 
instance, Wainwright (2000) showed that in many 
UK based retail corporations the value of corporate 
real estate assets exceeded the corporate market 
capitalisation. This can lead to hostile takeover 
attempts that have also been seen in the past. There 
are some theories that support this proposition. For 
instance, Ambrose (1990) provided evidence that the 
larger the corporate real estate holdings, the greater 
the likelihood of a company becoming a takeover 
target. There are also many other empirical studies 
that indicate that economic benefits are associated 
with companies that have less real estate on balance 
sheet (e.g., Kuruvilla 1994, Deng and Gyorko 1999 
and Pottinger, Dixon and Marston 2001). Further, 
Brounen and Eichholtz (2003) indicate that overall 
real estate ownership has been decreasing over time, 
which may be due to the raising popularity of lease 
alternatives. It must be remembered, though, that 
only a short time ago there were not many options 
for ownership. Brounen and Eichholtz (2003) also 
indicate that real estate ownership appears to be 
driven by industrial differences rather than national 
variations. Nevertheless, they suggest that the stock 
market returns are lowest among the companies with 
highest real estate ownership levels in each industry. 
This notion strongly supports the assumptions that 
real estate's risk-return profile is not fully recognised 
by stock markets, which might be 
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due to the stock markets' assumption that the best 
possible risk-return relationship takes place in 
corporations that focus solely on their core functions 
leaving other operations to the best possible service 
providers. 
2. RESEARCH PROBLEM, DATA AND 
METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Research problem 
The study investigates if large operational 
corporate real estate disposals carried out between 
the years 1998-2002 in Europe had a positive impact 
on the seller corporations' performance ratios. In 
addition, the study focuses on finding out whether 
the performance ratios of retail and telecom 
corporations, which carried out major operational 
real estate disposals between the years 1999-2002 
were significantly worse before the transactions than 
the performance ratios of other corporations at the 
same business sector. This research paper will 
answer the following questions. What kind of impact 
did the large operational real estate disposals have on 
the corporate performance ratios in general? Did the 
corporations in the retail and telecom sectors perform 
significantly worse before the operational real estate 
disposals than the industry benchmark? 
2.2. Research methodology and data 
Firstly, to find out if the sample corporations' 
performance ratios were enhanced by the real estate 
disposals a time-series analysis of corporate financial 
ratios was performed. The corporations' average 
performance ratios before 
the transaction were compared with the average 
performance ratios after the transactions. Secondly, 
in order to be able to answer the second research 
question, the telecom and retail corporations' average 
performance ratios before the disposals were 
compared to the respective industry benchmarks, 
which were separately formed for both business 
sectors. The analysis is based on the theory of cross-
sectional financial ratio analysis, in which a specific 
company is usually compared to another company, 
the industry average, or some "ideal" benchmark 
(Foster 1978). 
The financial ratios were calculated with the 
following formulas based on publicly available 
information in corporate annual and interim reports 
and web sites (Table 1). Two financial years were 
taken into account before and after the deal. 
The research data consists of three samples. The 
first sample was formed in order to investigate how 
corporate real estate disposals have affected 
corporate performance ratios. This sample consisted 
of performance ratios of European corporations that 
have been carrying out major real estate disposals 
during the past few years. Average corporate 
performance ratios were calculated for a two-year 
period before and after the real estate disposals. The 
sample included only transactions, in which 
corporations disposed mostly operational real estate, 
at least 1% of corporation's total assets and the 
disposals were worth at least 30 million euros. 
Furthermore, all the sample corporations were major 
stock exchange listed corporations, and if more than 
one transaction was carried out by the same 
corporation during the same financial year these 
transactions 
Table 1. Formulas used in calculating key performance ratios 
Return on total assets 
Equity ratio 
Current ratio 
Dividend per share 
Turnover growth 
= Total operating profit of the year / Average total assets during the year (*) = 
Total equity (incl. provisions and minority shares) in the end of the year / 
Total assets in the end of the year 
= Total current assets in the end of the year / Total current liabilities in the end of the year (**) 
= Year's total dividend per share announced by the corporation 
= (Year-end turnover - Beginning of the year turnover) / Beginning of th   year turnover _____  
* Average total assets = (Year-end total assets + beginning of the year total assets) / 2 
** Current assets are assets that can be changed into cash in short-term and current liabilities are debt that is to be paid back in one years time 
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were regarded as one disposal. This sample included 
22 disposals performed by 18 different companies 
between the years 1998-2002 (see Table 2). Retail 
corporations carried out over 30% of the total value 
of the sample transactions and telecom corporations 
almost 64%. Thus, the retail and telecom sectors 
together were responsible for almost 94% of the total 
value of the sample transactions, which is why 
these two sectors were chosen to be investigated 
more accurately. Due to the unavailability of 
financial data of the sample corporations, the study 
was restricted to transactions that were carried out 
between the years 1998-2002. The second sample 
was formed in order to compare whether the retail 
corporations that disposed large operational 
corporate real estate portfolios between the years 
1999-2002 were 
Table 2. The three samples of disposals used in the study 
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performing worse before the transactions than 
the industry average (see Table 2). The same 
criteria were used in choosing the corporations 
as in the first sample. In addition, the chosen 
corporations' strategy was to focus only on re-
tail business. The average corporate perfor-
mance ratios were calculated from a two-year 
period before the transactions. Kesko's trans-
action in 1998 was not included in the sample 
due to the difficulties in obtaining benchmark 
data from the year 1996. The third sample was 
formed the same way as the second sample, but 
this time for the telecom corporations (see 
Table 2). 
2.3. Industry benchmarks 
Similar data of performance ratios were 
collected for the benchmark corporations in the 
telecom and retail sectors. These two samples 
of time-series financial data were used as in- 
dustry benchmarks for telecom and retail sec-
tors that together formed almost 94% of the 
operational corporate real estate disposals per-
formed by major stock exchange listed compa-
nies in Western Europe between the years 1998-
2002. The same average and median per-
formance ratios were calculated from the same 
period of time for these corporations in order to 
be able to compare them to the sample cor-
porations. 
The industry benchmark for telecom corpo-
rations was formed from the rest of the major 
western European former governmental telecom 
corporations. Thus, the industry benchmark for 
telecom corporations included the following 
nine corporations: Aust-riaTelecom, Elisa from 
Finland, Dutch KPN, Portugal Telecom, Finnish 
Sonera, Spanish Telefonica, TeleDanmark, 
Norwegian Telenor and Swedish Telia. 
The corporations forming the retail indus- 
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try benchmark were generating most of their 
revenues in mixed retail businesses usually both out-
of-town and high street locations as most 
corporations in the retail sample. Similarly, the 
emphasis of the retail industry benchmark was on the 
UK market, which was also the case with the retail 
company sample. In addition, the corporations 
chosen for the retail industry benchmark were all 
stock-exchange listed and significant retailers in their 
own markets. Moreover, the availability of satisfac-
tory time-series of financial data was an important 
reason for choosing the particular corporations. 
Retail industry benchmark consisted of Swedish 
Axfood, Dutch Ahold, Wal-Mart from the US, 
French Pinault-Printemps-Redout, Finnish 
Stockmann and UK companies; Body Shop 
International, Boots, Debenhams, Great Universal 
Stores, Iceland, John Lewis, Safeway, Selfridges and 
Tesco. US-based Wal-Mart was included in the 
sample, because of its large market share in the 
groceries worldwide. For the year 1997 (and partly 
for 1998), the amount of corporations in the retail 
industry benchmark varies from 11 to 14 depending 
on the performance ratio, because of difficulties in 
obtaining appropriate financial data for these years 
concerning four corporations. 
3. THE SLB EFFECT ON CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE RATIOS 
The following table (Table 3) summarises the 
sale and leaseback effect on the corporate per-
formance ratios. One-fifth of the sample corpo-
rations divested over 10%, and 65% of them 
divested over 5% of their total assets in these 
transactions. All of the corporations that divested 
over 10% of their total assets were able to improve 
their return of total assets, and 75% (three out of 
four) were able to reduce the amount of debt in the 
corporation and/or to improve short-term solvency. 
An analysis of the real estate disposal effect 
indicates that the overall descending business cycle 
in Europe between the years 2000-2003 and other 
corporate operations seemed 
to be generally more influential factors in the 
corporations' performance in terms of their 
performance measures than the real estate disposal 
programs. However, yet about half of all the 
corporations that were studied were able to improve 
their profitability (12 out of 22 corporations), capital 
structure (9 out of 22) or short-term solvency (10 out 
of 22). In addition, 10 out of the total 22 corporations 
increased their dividend payments after the sale and 
leasebacks, out of which nine were retailers. 
It must be noted that only very few corporations 
were generally able to improve their performance 
during this period of low economical growth. For 
instance, the corporations that were used as industry 
benchmarks for the retail and telecom sector (see the 
section 4) show that the median return on assets 
(ROA) for retail corporations was 10.44% in 1998, 
and 7.69% in 2002. Further, in terms of the telecom 
corporations this fast downslide was even clearer. 
The median ROA for the telecom sector was 10.65% 
in 1998 and 1.88% in 2002. Thus, it is not surprising 
that the disposal impact was more evident in the 
more solid retail corporations than in the telecom 
sector. The large investments in new technology in 
the telecom sector and licenses in the Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) in the 
beginning of this millennium have clearly had the 
most significant effect on telecom corporations' key 
figures and performance. 
3.1. Different industries 
When investigating the disposal effects on the 
corporate key figures only in the retail industry, it 
can be noticed that nine out of the total twelve 
corporations have been able to improve their average 
return on total assets after the disposal (Table 4), 
when at the same time only three out of the ten other 
corporations succeeded in this. In addition, it is inter-
esting to notice that similarly nine out of the total 
twelve retail corporations have increased their 
dividend payments after the real estate sell-offs 
when at the same time only one cor- 
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poration out of all other business sectors managed to 
do this. Also retail companies' average and median 
key figures indicate that the disposal effect has been 
the clearest in the retail sector. For instance, the 
average return on assets, and both average and 
median dividend per share increased after the 
transactions among the retail companies. 
Furthermore, retail companies' average and median 
equity ratios were larger after the transactions than 
before. Therefore, it is clear that the real estate sell-
offs' impact on the corporate performance is easiest 
to notice in the more solid business sectors such as 
retail. 
On the other hand, also the sizes of the real estate 
disposals in comparison with the corporation's total 
assets have generally been much larger in the retail 
sector than in the 
telecom sector or in the 'others' category. When the 
retail corporations sold on average 8,4% of their total 
assets in these real estate disposals, the telecom 
corporations sold on average 6.3% and the rest of the 
corporations only 3,0% of their totals assets. Because 
of the gigantic sizes of telecom corporations' balance 
sheets, the huge corporate real estate disposals had 
not relatively as large significance as much smaller 
disposals in other corporate sectors. The huge 
investments in new technology in the beginning of 
this century swelled the telecom corporations' 
balance sheets and hence made it difficult to separate 
the real estate disposal effect on the corporate 
performance from other corporate operations. This is 
even though the disposed amount of assets in euros 
has 
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generally been clearly the largest among the telecom 
companies. 
4. CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
BEFORE THE DISPOSALS 
4.1. Retail corporations 
The retail corporations that carried out large-
scale operational real estate disposals have clearly 
been performing worse than the industry benchmark 
before the transactions, as the Table 5 shows. 
Although most of the retail corporations' 
performance ratios were worse than the industry 
benchmark before the transactions, the largest 
difference was in the return on total assets. 
Thus, the retail corporations that disposed of 
operational corporate real estate were less profitable 
than corporations generally in the same business 
sector before the transactions. The only exception 
was Marks & Spencer, which were performing 
slightly better than the industry on average before 
the transactions, but this was only in average terms. 
Nevertheless, Marks & Spencer have traditionally 
been a very profitable corporation, which begun to 
perform worse than usual during the late-90s. Thus, 
the disposal was partly intended to enhance the 
corporate performance. 
We cannot draw any overall conclusions of the 
corporations' capital structure, short-term solvency or 
turnover growth, although the industry averages and 
medians have overall been higher than in the sample, 
and in some cases corporations' capital structure and 
short-term solvency have been clearly worse than the 
industry benchmark. For instance, Carrefour and 
Metro had much worse capital structure than the 
industry in general, because of a very fast growth 
period before the transactions. Carrefour's turnover 
grew approx. 36.3% in 1998 and 73.4% in 1999 due 
to mergers and acquisitions becoming the world's 
second largest and Europe's largest retailer (merged 
with Promod
 
s in 1999). Similarly, Metro's turnover 
growth was 61.3% in 1997 due to a heavily in- 
ternational investment program and expansion 
(acquisitions of Allkauf in Germany and European 
C&C operations of SHV Makro NV during 1997). 
As a whole, in six out of ten disposal cases the 
corporation has had more leverage than the industry 
in general, and in seven out of ten disposals the 
seller-corporation has had worse current ratio than 
the industry benchmark before the transactions (see 
Table 5). 
The industry benchmark performance ratios 
provided by Reuters also support the assumptions 
(Table 6). However, the Reuters industry average 
shown below is mostly based on the corporations in 
the US market and therefore the figures are not fully 
comparable with the sample corporations. In 
addition, the time period is very different and the 
calculation method can also differ. Nevertheless, it 
clearly seems that most of the corporations that have 
been selling corporate real estate in the retail sector 
in Europe have been performing worse than usual, at 
least in terms of return on total assets. 
4.2. Telecom corporations 
Table 7 below shows the average before 
transaction performance ratios of the corporations 
that disposed of operational corporate real estate in 
the telecom sector during the years 1999-2002. In 
most cases the corporations that carried out these 
real estate disposals in the telecom sector were in 
worse condition in terms of capital structure and 
short-term solvency than other corporations in the 
same sector at the same time. Only Deutsche 
Telecom had clearly better situation in terms of 
equity ratio than the industry before the disposals. 
Telecom Italia was also very close to the equity ratio 
levels of the industry benchmark, but when it comes 
to short-term solvency all the sample corporations 
had much lower amount of short-term capital 
compared to short-term liabilities as opposed to the 
industry in general. 
Nevertheless, in four out of six cases the 
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seller corporations' profitability had exceeded the 
industry average (Table 7). In addition, as Carrefour 
and Metro in the retail sector also some corporations 
in the telecom sector (mainly British Telecom and 
France Telecom) were growing faster than the 
industry benchmark before the transactions in terms 
of turnover growth. 
The dramatic recession, which followed the huge 
investments in new technology in the telecom sector, 
can be seen in the current telecom industry 
profitability. The industry benchmark return on 
assets announced by Reuters was only 3.39% in 
March 2004 for Communications services sector and 
even less for Computer networks sector (Table 8). 
The outcome of this study yields similar results. In 
2002, the industry median was only 1.88% perhaps 
due to the huge amounts of debt taken for 
investments in new technology. In 2001, the same 
figure was 3.60%. 
It is equally interesting to notice Reuters' debt to 
equity-ratio for the Communications services 
industry. Debt to equity-ratio of 0.953 means that the 
Equity ratio for this industry is little over 50%. Thus, 
we can suggest also based on this that the telecom 
corporations that have been performing large-scale 
real estate sale and leasebacks in Europe have 
certainly been much more heavily leveraged than the 
industry in general. Similar assumptions can be 
made from the current ratio, which is also much 
higher than in our sample group. However, as 
already mentioned the time period is very different 
than in our case, the calculation methods can vary 
and many of the corporations' markets are different 
from our sample. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this research paper was to study 
the effects of real estate sale and leasebacks on the 
corporate performance ratios. Subsequently, the 
study investigated whether the performance ratios of 
the retail and telecom corporations disposing of 
operational corporate real estate were significantly 
worse than the industry benchmark before the 
transactions. 
Some evidence was found that the retail 
corporations that have been disposing of operational 
corporate real estate were less profitable as opposed 
to other corporations in the same business sector 
before the transactions. It might be that these 
corporations had much larger real estate holdings 
than the corporations in the retail sector on average, 
which had led to a lower, on average, return on total 
assets. On the other hand, the telecom corporations 
that have been performing real estate sell-offs had 
generally worse capital structure and short-term 
solvency than the corporations in the same business 
sector before the transactions. In this case the real 
estate disposals were seen more as a fast way to 
improve corporations' solvency and capital structure. 
All the corporations that sold over 10% of their 
total assets as real estate disposals between the years 
1998-2001 were able to improve their profitability. 
Most of them also improved their capital structure 
and short-term solvency, even though the business 
cycle at the same time was not very good. In 
addition, over half of the total 22 corporations under 
investigation were able to improve their profitability, 
capital structure or short-term solvency despite the 
slump in the world economy. The effect on 
performance ratios was clearest in the retail sector, 
where nine out of the total twelve studied 
corporations were able to improve average return on 
total assets, when at the same time only 30% of the 
other corporations were able to do this. Similarly, 
nine out of the total twelve retail corporations 
increased their dividend payments after the real 
estate sell-offs, when at the same time only one 
corporation from all other business sectors managed 
to do this. 
In future studies, it would be interesting to see 
more evidence of the underlying reasons for the 
corporate real estate sale and leasebacks direct from 
the seller-corporations. This could be done, for 
instance, as a case study or by means of an interview 
study. It would 
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also be interesting to study how these property 
outsourcings have succeeded, and whether the 
corporate and corporate real estate performance has 
been better after the transactions than before them. 
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APPENDIX 1: TIME-SERIES USED IN THE STUDY 
 
* the time-series data include two financial statements before and after me deal, ER:s were calculated as stated in table 1 
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* the time-series data include two financial statements before and after the deal, dividends are in euros 
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* the time-series data include two financial statements before and after the deal 
